1. Executive summary
AI agents no longer just answer questions. Through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), they read files, query databases, update CRMs, and run commands, using credentials your company issued. Most security teams cannot see those actions, let alone approve them.
Traditional access control authorizes an agent once, at login. MCP needs a decision on every tool call, because the actor making that call is a language model that can be steered by the very text it reads.
This paper sets out eight controls that put one policy checkpoint in front of every MCP server. It maps them to NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 42001, the EU AI Act, GDPR, India's DPDP Act, and more, and gives you a quick way to score where you stand. Igris appears only in the final chapter.
2. From chat to action
MCP turned AI from something that talks into something that acts, and the security model has not caught up.
In plain terms, MCP is a standard plug. An AI agent (the client) connects to MCP servers, and each server exposes tools: query this database, create that ticket, read this folder. The server holds credentials to the real system behind it. When the model decides to call a tool, the action happens with your company's authority.
Three things make this different from any API you have secured before. The decision-maker is a language model, and it can be steered by text it reads in an email, a document, or a ticket. Servers are often granted far broader permissions than the task needs. And new servers are easy to install, so they spread through engineering teams faster than security can review them.
Figure 01
Agents act with your authority, and trust breaks at four points
Trigger
user, email, ticket
1AI agent
MCP client, decides which tool to call
MCP servers2
Your systems
Where trust breaks
- 1Hidden instructions in content steer the agent
- 2Servers hold broad, long-lived credentials
- 3Unreviewed servers join quietly
- 4No record of which tool did what, for whom
Three ways it goes wrong
- The steered agent. A coding agent reads a support ticket containing hidden instructions, and runs a destructive command against a shared environment.
- The over-scoped server. A CRM server built for reading accounts also holds write and delete permissions, so one bad tool call can change customer records.
- The shadow server. A developer installs a community MCP package that nobody reviewed. Researchers have already documented malicious MCP packages published to public registries.
Why IAM and API security are not enough
Identity systems authorize the agent once, when it connects. API gateways see requests but not the intent behind a tool call or the arguments inside it. Neither can answer the question that matters for agents: should this specific action, by this agent, with these arguments, happen right now? That question needs an answer on every single call.
3. The MCP threat landscape
MCP risk enters at three points: before a server ever runs, in who is allowed to do what, and inside each tool call.
The OWASP MCP Top 10 names these risks for the protocol itself. It is still in beta, so we pair it with the finalized OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, which covers agent behavior more broadly, including agent goal hijack (ASI01), agentic supply chain vulnerabilities (ASI04), unexpected code execution (ASI05), and rogue agents (ASI10). The Coalition for Secure AI's MCP security paper adds a detailed threat taxonomy and secure design patterns.
The figure below groups the OWASP MCP risks by where they enter, with badges showing which of the eight controls in chapter 4 reduce each one. One risk, missing audit and telemetry, cuts across everything: without a record of tool calls, every other risk becomes harder to detect and impossible to prove.
Figure 02
MCP risk enters at three points, and missing logs hide all of them
Before it runs
Who can do what
Inside each call
4. The 8 controls for MCP runtime governance
Eight controls, applied at one checkpoint between agents and every MCP server, turn invisible agent actions into governed, recorded decisions.
They work as a set. The first two make sure you know every server and trust what it offers. The next four decide, on every call, whether an action may happen and with what. The last two watch behavior over time and prove what happened.
Figure 03
Eight controls: two discover, four enforce, two watch and prove
Discover
Control 01
Server inventory
Every server known, local configs discovered
Control 02
Pre-deploy scans
Servers checked before they go live
Enforce
Control 03
Tool-level access
Deny by default, per tool and user
Control 04
Vaulted keys
Agents never hold real credentials
Control 05
Argument checks
Sensitive data and risky inputs stopped
Control 06
Kill switch
Any agent connection stopped immediately
Watch and prove
Control 07
Behavior alerts
Spikes and destructive calls raise an alert
Control 08
Tool-call audit
Every call recorded with who and what
Figure 04
Every tool call is checked, then given a key, then recorded
The checkpoint
Blocked
The reason is returned, and the event is logged
Audit and behavior watch
Controls 6, 7, 8Every decision is recorded.
Unusual patterns alert a responder, who can suspend the session.
The agent never holds the real key, a blocked call always returns a reason, and every decision lands in the audit trail.
5. Framework crosswalk
Auditors rarely ask about MCP by name yet, but every framework they use already asks the questions MCP raises: who can act, with what access, and where is the record?
The table maps each control to the clauses it supports. NIST is also developing control overlays and identity guidance specifically for AI agents, so expect agent-level expectations to sharpen. Building these controls now puts you ahead of that curve. As always, no tool makes you compliant on its own; the right layer supplies the controls and the evidence.
A note on the EU AI Act. Articles 12, 14, and 15 apply in law to high-risk AI systems. For every other agent deployment, they remain the clearest public benchmark for logging, human oversight, and security, and enterprise buyers increasingly read them that way.
6. The MCP Governance Maturity Model
Most teams adopting agents start at level one, where nobody can list every MCP server in use, and each level up closes a door attackers rely on.
Figure 05
Each maturity level closes a door attackers rely on
Level 01
Unknown
Servers not listed
Agents hold real keys
Level 02
Inventoried
Every server known and scanned
Level 03
Enforced
Every call checked
Keys vaulted
Kill switch ready
Level 04
Evidenced
Behavior watched
Every call provable
Audit is an export
Maturity grows from left to right; no level can be skipped →
Score yourself
Tick each statement that is true for your organization today.
How to read your score. Zero or one tick: Level 1, Unknown. Two or three: Level 2, Inventoried. Four or five: Level 3, Enforced. All six: Level 4, Evidenced.
7. Industry playbooks
Every industry runs different agents, so the first controls to switch on differ too.
8. A three-phase rollout
Govern agents the way you would onboard a new employee: first learn what they touch, then set the rules, then keep the records.
Figure 06
Discover, enforce, prove: each phase stands on its own
Phase 01
Discover
- Find every MCP server
- Review before go-live
- Move keys into a vault
Phase 02
Enforce
- Riskiest tools first
- Argument checks switched on
- Kill switch tested
Phase 03
Prove
- Behavior alerts live
- On-demand PDF reports
- Framework-mapped evidence
Observe first, then enforce, so engineering keeps moving
Start with log-and-allow (alert) rules, so engineering sees no friction while security gets its first complete picture. Then switch on policies for the riskiest tools first, such as anything that deletes, writes, or moves money.
9. Buyer's checklist
Before choosing any MCP security platform, ask these eight questions; a strong vendor answers each one with a demo, not a slide.
- Can it show every MCP server our agents use, including ones developers installed themselves?
- Does it scan servers and tool definitions before they go live?
- Is every tool call deny-by-default, with policy at the level of individual tools?
- Are real credentials injected at the gateway, so agents never hold them?
- Can policies inspect tool arguments, not just tool names?
- Can a responder suspend an agent session immediately?
- Does it flag unusual behavior, such as a never-before-seen tool or a sudden spike?
- Is every call logged and exportable as evidence, and can we retain it for as long as our auditors need?
10. How Igris delivers this
Igris puts seven of the eight controls between your agents and every MCP server, and developers adopt it with a TypeScript SDK or by pointing their MCP client at Sentinel's URL with an Igris API key, rather than a rebuild.
Two Igris products carry this paper's controls. Igris Sentinel is the MCP gateway that every tool call passes through: it identifies the caller, matches policy, injects credentials, routes the call, and records it. Igris Lens turns every event into one timeline with incidents, alerts, and audit-ready reports.
Figure 07
Igris sits between every agent and every MCP server, and records it all
Your AI agents
TypeScript SDK or HTTP
the MCP gateway
Igris Sentinel
- 01Identify the caller
- 02Match policy
- 03Inject credentials
- 04Route the call
- 05Record the decision
MCP servers
Igris Lens
- Every call in one timeline
- Incidents and behavior alerts
- Kill switch for any connection
Real-time alerts
Slack and Discord
Audit evidence
Reports, CSV and JSON
Every control, mapped
Sentinel ships a TypeScript SDK, and any language can reach it over HTTP.
See it on your own agents
The best way to judge any of this is on your own agent traffic. Book a demo at igrisecurity.com and we will walk through the eight controls live, starting with Phase 1: discover every server.
Sources
- Agent and MCP security: OWASP MCP Top 10 (beta), OWASP Agentic Security Initiative, CoSAI MCP Security guide, MITRE ATLAS
- NIST: AI Risk Management Framework, AI 600-1, IR 8596 Cyber AI Profile (preliminary draft), AI Agent Standards Initiative, COSAiS control overlays (in development)
- ISO and ETSI: ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27701, ETSI EN 304 223
- European Union: EU AI Act, GDPR, DORA
- India: DPDP Rules (obligations phasing in through 2027), India AI Governance Guidelines, CERT-In Directions
- Industry and assurance: SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, HIPAA Security Rule, PCI DSS, GLBA Safeguards